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A FINITE AXIOMATIZATION OF G-DEPENDENCE
GIANLUCA PAOLINI
Abstract. We show that a form of dependence known as G-dependence (orig-
inally introduced by Grelling) admits a very natural finite axiomatization, as
well as Armstrong relations. We also give an explicit translation between
functional dependence and G-dependence.
1. Introduction
In this paper we study a form of dependence originally introduced by Grelling
[4], and recently analyzed by Va¨a¨na¨nen [11] in the context of database dependency
theory and team semantics. The main objective of the paper is to provide a fi-
nite axiomatization of G-dependence, and to give an explicit translation between
functional dependence and G-dependence.
First of all, let us explain this notion of dependence, and where it comes from.
In [4] Grelling lays the foundations of a mathematical theory of dependence, isolat-
ing several notions of dependence and noticing various properties that they satisfy.
Among them, there is the notion of functional dependence, later axiomatized by
Armstrong in the context of database theory (see [1]), and other notions of de-
pendence familiar in combinatorics, specifically in the study of closure operators
(see e.g. [8]). Grelling also introduces a notion of dependence that fails to fit with
any of the currently known forms of dependence studied in database dependency
theory and combinatorics. He calls it varequidependence, but we will refer to it
simply as G-dependence (G for Grelling). From the perspective of database theory,
G-dependence can be described as follows: a set of attributes y G-depends on a set
of attributes x in the database X if for any two rows s, s′ of X for which exactly
one xi ∈ x has different values, there exists at least one yj ∈ y such that yj has
different values in s and s′.
To give an example of G-dependence consider Table 1, where we see an example
of a database storing informations about salaries of the (unfortunately not so hy-
pothetical) university U . First, we recall the definition of functional dependence,
to compare the two notions: we say that a set of attributes y functionally depends
on a set of attributes x in the database X if for any two rows s, s′ of X if s and s′
agree on x, then they also agree on y. Now, according to this definition, the salary
of an academic in the university U depends on his/her academic title, and also on
the combination of his/her academic title and his/her years of experience. This
sounds very reasonable, what a good university university U is, one would think.
But if we look at the table we actually notice that both Dr. Marie and Dr. John
have the same salary despite John has only 1 year of experience and Marie has 10!
The research of the author was supported by the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters
(Vilho, Yrjo¨ and Kalle Va¨isa¨la¨ foundation). The author would like to thank Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen for
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Name Title Years of Experience Salary
John PhD 1 e2200
Marie PhD 10 e2200
Paolo Professor 5 e3500
Sara Professor 7 e3500
Figure 1. Salaries of university U
Thus, the claimed dependence of salary from academic title and years of experience
seems very counterintuitive. On the other hand, if we appeal to G-dependence we
see that this is not the case, since, letting the academic title fixed, more years of
experience do not imply an increase in salary in the salary system of university
U . One of the virtues of G-dependence is the solution of this pathology of func-
tional dependence. G-dependence is in fact a form of dependence that respects
very closely our intuitions about dependence. Given its intuitive appeal we want
to analyze G-dependence in a mathematical fashion, using the tools from database
dependency theory and team semantics.
We first give some background. Team semantics is a new logical framework, orig-
inally introduced by Hodges [5] and later developed by Va¨a¨na¨nen [10], which aims
at the construction of a logical theory of various phenomena such as (in)dependence,
uncertainty and information. The common denominator of this line of research is
the evaluation of logical formulas in function of so-called teams, i.e. sets (or multi-
sets) of assignments to a given set of variables. This widens the scope of traditional
logical systems, allowing for the modelling of new non-classical phenomena. For
example, the use of several assignments allows to give meaning to logical atoms
expressing various dependency relations among variables, and the consequent con-
struction of extensions of first-order and propositional logic. This particular line of
research is known as dependence logic [10]. Another scope of application of team
semantics is in the realm of (quantum) information theory [7] and probability logic
[6]. In fact, the multiplicity of assignments under which we evaluate formulas allows
for the introduction of various probabilistic notions and the consequent construction
of interesting logics.
Soon after its birth, dependence logic was brought to the rediscovery of a rich
field of research active since the ’70s, known as database dependency theory [9]. This
part of database theory aims primarily at the analysis and axiomatization of the
various forms of constraints that a database can be subject to. The fundamental
connection between database theory and teams semantics is that any database can
be immediately considered as a set of assignments (i.e. a team) and the other way
around. Consequently, database dependency theory and dependence logic overlap
significantly in many respects, and can be considered as a general framework for
the study of dependence.
We will then use this established technology to study our object of interest, i.e.
G-dependence. In this paper will give a complete axiomatization of G-dependence,
in the style of Armstrong’s axiomatization of functional dependence [1], a problem
left open in Va¨a¨na¨nen’s treatment of G-dependence [11]. We will also prove that G-
dependence admits Armstrong relations, in the sense of [1], [3] and [2], and provide
an explicit translation between G-dependence and functional dependence. Finally,
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in the style of the dependence logic of [10], we will build an extension of first-order
logic called G-dependence logic and use the above mentioned translation between
G-dependence and functional dependence to conclude that G-dependence logic has
the same expressive power of existential second-order logic.
2. G-Dependence
In this section we define what a team is, and see how to define G-dependence.
We then define a logical language made of atomic expressions called G-dependence
atoms, and provide a set of rules and axioms for this language under the intended
semantics of G-dependence.
Let Var be a countable set of symbols, called attributes or individual variables.
Definition 2.1 (Team). A team X with values in a set A and domain dom(X) ⊆
Var is a pair (I, τ) such that I is a set and τ : I → Adom(X) is a function.
Notice that a team is nothing but a database with multiple rows, i.e. the same
tuple is allowed to occur several times. Elsewhere in the literature (e.g. [6]) what we
call a team is referred to as a multiteam. We only talk of teams here for simplicity.
Given a team X = (I, τ) and s ∈ I we denote the value τ(s)(x) simply as x(s).
Example 2.2. In Figure 2 we see an example of a team X = ({0, 1, 2, 3} , τ) with
values in 2 = {0, 1} and domain {x0, x1, y0, y1}. The values xi(s) and yi(s) are
evident from the table, e.g. x0(0) = 0, x1(3) = 0 and y0(1) = 1.
x0 x1 y0 y1
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
Figure 2. Example of a team
Definition 2.3. Let X = (I, τ) be a team and x and y finite sets of variables from
dom(X). We say that y G-depends on x, in symbols X |= ≎(x, y), if for every
s, s′ ∈ I, if there exists exactly one xi ∈ x such that xi(s) 6= xi(s
′), then there
exists at least one yj ∈ y such that yj(s) 6= yj(s′).
We will refer to formulas of the form ≎(x, y) as in Definition 4.1, as G-dependence
atoms. We stress here that in expressions of the kind ≎(x, y) we consider x and y
as sets of variables, not sequences. Following this convention, we use expressions
like ≎(x, yz) to mean ≎(x, y ∪ z). Furthermore, if in the formula ≎(x, y) the set x
is a singleton {x0} we simply write ≎(x0, y).
Example 2.4. As an example, for the team X represented in Figure 2 we have:
X |= ≎(x0, y0), X |= ≎(x0x1, y0), X |= ≎(x0y0, y1), X 6|= ≎(x0x1, y1).
Notice that in analogy with functional dependence and similar forms of depen-
dence, the G-dependence atom is local, i.e. the truth of X |= ≎(x, y) depends only
on the values of the variables occurring in x or y.
As usual, we let:
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i) X |= Σ if X |= σ for every σ ∈ Σ;
ii) Σ |= σ if, for every team X , X |= Σ implies X |= σ.
The goal of the present paper is to find a complete axiomatization of the relation
Σ |= σ, where Σ contains G-dependence atoms. I.e. we want to find a fundamental
set of principles (rules) that govern the properties of the G-dependence atoms, and
we want to find them so that they are complete. That is, all the G-dependence
atoms that semantically follow from the given ones, also deductively follow from
them, i.e. follow from them according to the rules.
The deductive system for G-dependence atoms consists of the following six rules1,
where for an atom≎(x, y) we let x = {x0, ..., xn−1}, and, for i < n, we let (x−xi)y =
{xj ∈ x : j 6= i} ∪ y.
(A0)
≎(∅, y)
(A1)
≎(x, x)
≎(x, y)
(R0)
≎(xi, (x− xi)y)
≎(x0, (x− x0)y) · · · ≎(xn−1, (x− xn−1)y)
(R′0)
≎(x0 · · ·xn−1, y)
≎(x, y)
(R1)
≎(x, yz)
≎(z0, y) · · · ≎(zn−1, y) ≎(x0, z0 · · · zn−1)
(R2)
≎(x0, y)
We refer to rules with an empty set of premises as axioms, and consequently
reserve the term rule to rules with at least one premise. A deduction with premises
on a set of atoms Σ is a sequence of atoms (σ0, ..., σn−1) such that each σi is either
an instance of the axioms of our deductive system, or an atom in Σ, or follows from
one or more atoms of {σ0, ..., σi−1} by one of its rules. We say that σ is provable
from Σ, in symbols Σ ⊢ σ, if there is a deduction (σ0, ..., σn−1) with premises on Σ
and σ = σn−1.
1The isolation of rules (R0) and (R′0) is due to Tapani Hyttinen.
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3. Completeness
In this section we prove the main results of the paper, i.e. the completeness of
the deductive system introduced in Section 2 and the admissibility of the so-called
Armstrong relations.
We denote the set of natural numbers by ω.
Theorem 3.1. Let Σ ∪ {σ} be a set of G-dependence atoms. Then
Σ ⊢ σ if and only if Σ |= σ
I.e. the G-dependence deductive system is sound and complete.
Proof. Regarding soundness, the soundness of (A0), (A1) and (R1) is clear. We
prove the soundness of (R0). Let X = (I, τ) 6|= ≎(xi, (x − xi)y), then there exist
s, s′ ∈ I such that xi(s) 6= xi(s′) and zj(s) = zj(s′) for every zj ∈ (x − xi)y.
Thus, X 6|= ≎(x, y), since xi(s) 6= xi(s′), all the xj different than xi are so that
xj(s) = xj(s
′) and furthermore for every yj ∈ y we have yj(s) = yj(s′).
We prove the soundness of (R′0). Let X = (I, τ) 6|= ≎(x, y), then there exist
s, s′ ∈ I and xi ∈ x such that xi(s) 6= xi(s′), all the xj different than xi are so
that xj(s) = xj(s
′) and furthermore for every yj ∈ y we have yj(s) = yj(s′). Thus,
X 6|= ≎(xi, (x−xi)y), since xi(s) 6= xi(s′) but zj(s) = zj(s′) for every zj ∈ (x−xi)y.
Finally, we prove the soundness of (R2). Let X = (I, τ) 6|= ≎(x0, y), then there
exist s, s′ ∈ I such that x0(s) 6= x0(s′) and yj(s) = yj(s′) for every yj ∈ y. If there
exists i < n such that zi(s) 6= zi(s′), then X 6|= ≎(zi, y). If, on the other hand,
zi(s) = zi(s
′) for every i < n, then X 6|= ≎(x0, z0 · · · zn−1).
Regarding completeness, suppose that Σ 0 σ, and let
σ = ≎(x0 · · ·xn−1, y0 · · · ym−1) = ≎(x, y).
We want to build a team X with domain Var and values in 2 = {0, 1} such that
X |= Σ and X 6|= σ. W.l.o.g. we can assume that Σ is deductively closed, i.e. if
Σ ⊢ pi, then pi ∈ Σ. Because of axiom (A0) we must have that n > 1. Furthermore,
there has to be i < n such that ≎(xi, (x−xi)y) 6∈ Σ and xi 6∈ y. First of all, suppose
that ≎(xi, (x − xi)y) ∈ Σ, for every i < n. Then, by (R′0), we have ≎(x, y) ∈ Σ,
contradicting the assumption. Let then i < n such that ≎(xi, (x − xi)y) 6∈ Σ, and
suppose that xi ∈ y, then by consecutively applying (A1) and (R1), we obtain
≎(xi, (x − xi)y) ∈ Σ, which is contradictory. Thus, there exists i < n such that
≎(xi, (x − xi)y) 6∈ Σ and xi 6∈ y. W.l.o.g. ≎(x0, (x − x0)y) 6∈ Σ and x0 6∈ y. We
want to define V0, V1 ⊆ Var such that V0 ∩ V1 = ∅ and V0 ∪ V1 = Var, to be used in
the construction of the team X . Let then {vi : i < ω} = Var, and for i < ω let:{
vi ∈ V0 if ≎(vi, x1 · · ·xn−1y) 6∈ Σ
vi ∈ V1 otherwise.
Notice that x0 ∈ V0, since we are assuming that ≎(x0, (x−x0)y) 6∈ Σ. Furthermore,
by (A1) and (R1), {x1, ..., xn−1, y0, ..., ym−1} ⊆ V1. Let now X = (2, τ) be the team
such that for every v ∈ Var{
v(0) = 0 and v(1) = 1 if v ∈ V0
v(0) = v(1) = 0 if v ∈ V1.
That is, X looks as in Figure 3. Evidently, X 6|= σ (recall that x0 6∈ y). We
want to show that X |= Σ. Because of the rules (R0) and (R
′
0), it suffices to show
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x0 x1 · · · xn−1 y0 · · · ym−1 V0 V1
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
1 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1 0
Figure 3. The team X
that for every σ′ = ≎(z0, w0 · · ·wk−1) ∈ Σ we have X |= σ′. In fact, suppose
this is the case and let ≎(x′, y′) = ≎(x′0 · · ·x
′
k−1, y
′) ∈ Σ, we want to show that
X |= ≎(x′, y′). By rule (R0), for every i < k we have ≎(x′i, (x
′− x′i)y
′) ∈ Σ, since Σ
is deductively closed. Thus, for every i < k, we have X |= ≎(x′i, (x
′ − x′i)y
′), since
we are assuming that for all σ′ = ≎(z0, w0 · · ·wk−1) ∈ Σ we have X |= σ′. Hence,
by the soundness of rule (R′0), we can conclude that X |= ≎(x
′, y′), as wanted. Let
then σ′ = ≎(z0, w0 · · ·wk−1) ∈ Σ. If z0 ∈ V1 or {w0, ..., wk−1} ∩ V0 6= ∅, then of
course X |= σ′. Suppose then that z0 ∈ V0 and {w0, ..., wk−1} ⊆ V1. Then for every
i < k we have ≎(wi, x
∗y) ∈ Σ, where x∗ = {x1, ..., xn−1}. Thus, because of (R2),
we have:
Σ
≎(w0, x
∗y)
Σ
· · ·
Σ
≎(wk−1, x
∗y)
Σ
≎(z0, w0 · · ·wk−1)
(R2)
≎(z0, x
∗y)
And so ≎(z0, x
∗y) ∈ Σ, which implies that z0 6∈ V0, a contradiction.
Using the “disjoint union” technique of Beeri et al. (cf. [3] and [2]) it is now
immediate to conclude the existence of Armstrong relations for G-dependence.
Theorem 3.2 (Existence of Armstrong Relations). Let Σ be a set of G-dependence
atoms. Then there exists a team X , called an Armstrong relation, such that
X |= σ iff Σ ⊢ σ.
Proof. W.l.o.g. Σ is deductively closed. Let Σ∗ be the set of G -dependence atoms
not in Σ and (σ2i)i<k6ω an enumeration of Σ
∗. For every σ = σ2i ∈ Σ
∗ we have that
Σ 0 σ, and so by the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can find X2i = ({2i, 2i+ 1} , τ2i),
with τ2i : {2i, 2i+ 1} → {2i, 2i+ 1}
Var
, such that X2i |= Σ and X2i 6|= σ. Let
n = 2(k + 1) if k < ω, and n = ω otherwise. Let X = ({i : i < n} , τ) be such that,
for i < k and v ∈ Var, we let
τ(2i)(v) =
{
τ2i(2i)(v) if ≎(v, ∅) 6∈ Σ
0 otherwise
and
τ(2i + 1)(v) =
{
τ2i(2i+ 1)(v) if ≎(v, ∅) 6∈ Σ
0 otherwise.
We claim that
X |= σ iff σ ∈ Σ.
If σ 6∈ Σ, then σ = σ2i ∈ Σ
∗ for some i < k and so the rows 2i and 2i + 1 of X
witness that X 6|= σ. Let σ ∈ Σ, we show that X |= σ. As in the proof of Theorem
3.1, it suffices to show that X |= σ for σ = ≎(x0, y0 · · · ym−1). Thus, suppose that
σ = ≎(x0, y0 · · · ym−1). There are two cases.
Case 1. ≎(yj , ∅) ∈ Σ, for every j < m. Because of rule (R2) we have
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Σ
≎(y0, ∅)
Σ
· · ·
Σ
≎(ym−1, ∅)
Σ
≎(x0, y0 · · · ym−1)
(R2)
≎(x0, ∅)
Thus, it is clear that X |= σ, because x0(s) = 0 for every s < n.
Case 2. There exists j∗ < m such that ≎(yj∗ , ∅) 6∈ Σ. To show that X |= σ,
assume that x0(s) 6= x0(s′) for some s < s′ < n. Since ≎(yj∗ , ∅) 6∈ Σ, we have:
yj∗(s) = τ2i(s)(yj∗) and yj∗(s
′) = τ2i′ (s
′)(yj∗).
If 2i 6= 2i′, then yj∗(s) 6= yj∗(s′) by definition and we are done.
Otherwise, if 2i = 2i′, s = 2i and s′ = 2i+ 1, then, since X2i |= σ, there exists
j < m such that τ2i(s)(yj) 6= τ2i(s′)(yj), which implies ≎(yj , ∅) 6∈ Σ (as X2i |= Σ).
Thus,
yj(s) = τ2i(s)(yj) 6= τ2i(s
′)(yj) = yj(s
′),
and so we are done.
4. G-Dependence Logic
In this short section we give an explicit translation between the G-dependence
atom and the dependence atom, and vice versa, thus answering one of Va¨a¨na¨nen’s
questions from [11] (see the question after Proposition 2). We use this translation
and results from [10, Chapter 6] to show that the expressive power of a natural
logic built using G-dependence atoms (which we will call G-dependence logic) has
the same expressive power as Σ11, i.e. existential second-order logic. Notice that
the axiomatization of G-dependence given in the previous section is not an axioma-
tization of G-dependence logic as defined below, but only an axiomatization of the
G-dependence atoms.
Definition 4.1 (Functional Dependence). Let X = (I, τ) be a team and x and y
finite sets of variables from dom(X). We say that y (functionally) depends on x,
in symbols X |= =(x, y), if for every s, s′ ∈ I, if x(s) = x(s′), then y(s) = y(s′).
Proposition 4.2. Let X be a team and x and y finite sets of variables from
dom(X). Then2,
(1) X |= =(x, y) ⇔
∧
i<n
X |= =(x, yi) ⇔
∧
i<n
X |= ≎(yi, x),
(2) X |= ≎(x, y) ⇔
∧
i<n
X |= ≎(xi, (x− xi)y) ⇔
∧
i<n
X |= =((x − xi)y, xi).
Proof. Concerning (1), the first equivalence is immediate, while the second follows
directly from [11, Lemma 1, Item 5]. Concerning (2), the first equivalence is because
of the soundness of rules (R0) and (R
′
0), while the second follows again from [11,
Lemma 1, Item 5].
2The conjunctions below are taken in the metalanguage, they simply mean that for every i < n
the corresponding formula is true in X.
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We now describe how to extend first-order logic into two new logics: G-dependence
logic and dependence logic. Given a vocabulary L, we define GDep(L)− (resp.
Dep(L)−) to be the set of atomic and negation of atomic L-formulas (L-literals),
identity atoms and G-dependence atoms (resp. dependence atoms). We then de-
fine GDep(L) (resp. Dep(L)) to be the language obtained closing GDep(L)− (resp.
Dep(L)−) under ∧, ∨, ∃ and ∀ (no negations). Given φ ∈ GDep(L) (or Dep(L))
we denote by Free(φ) the set of free variables occurring in φ.
Definition 4.3 (Semantics). Let L be a vocabulary, M an L-structure, φ ∈
GDep(L) (resp. φ ∈ Dep(L)) and X = (I, τ) a team with values in the domain of
M and Free(φ) ⊆ dom(X). We define M |=X φ as follows:
(1) φ is≎(x, y) (resp. =(x, y)). ThenM |=X φ iffX |= ≎(x, y) (resp. X |= =(x, y)).
(2) φ is a literal. Then M |=X φ iff for every i ∈ I, M |=τ(i) φ in the usual
first-order sense.
(3) φ is ψ ∧ θ. Then M |=X φ iff M |=X ψ and M |=X θ.
(4) φ is ψ ∨ θ. Then M |=X φ iff there exist J,K ⊆ I such that J ∪K = I and
(J, τ ↾ J) |= ψ and (K, τ ↾ K) |= θ (↾ denotes restriction of functions as usual).
(5) φ is ∃xψ. Then M |=X φ iff there exists a fucntion F : I → M such that
(I, τ(F )) |= ψ, where, for i ∈ I, τ(F )(i)(x) = F (i), and τ(F )(i)(y) = τ(i)(y)
for every y ∈ dom(X)− {x}.
(6) φ is ∀xψ. Then M |=X φ iff (I ×M, τ(M)) |= ψ, where, for (i, a) ∈ I ×M ,
τ(M)((i, a))(x) = a, and τ(M)((i, a))(y) = τ(i)(y) for every y ∈ dom(X)−{x}.
Usually dependence logic and its variants are defined with respect to teams
X = (I, τ) such that for i 6= j ∈ I we have τ(i) 6= τ(j). Clearly to every team X as
in Definition 2.1 we can associate canonically a team X ′ satisfying this additional
assumption. Notice that if φ is as in Definition 4.3 then M |=X φ iff M |=X′ φ.
We now prove the announced characterization of the expressive power of GDep(L).
For a quick introduction to second-order logic see e.g. [10, Chapter 6]).
Corollary 4.4. For every vocabulary L and G-dependence logic sentence φ in the
vocabulary L, there exists a Σ11 sentence Φ in the vocabulary L such that for every
L-structure M we have
M |= φ ⇔ M |= Φ.
Conversely, for every vocabulary L and Σ11 sentence Φ in the vocabulary L there
exists a G-dependence logic sentence φ in the vocabulary L such that the above
holds.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 4.2 (and a straightforward induction), and
Corollary 6.2 and Theorem 6.15 of [10]
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